

# The Value of Dangerous Sport

J.S. Russell

If sport requires the development and exercise of physical skills for overcoming unnecessary obstacles, it is hardly surprising that physical danger is found in sporting activity. A moment's reflection, however, reveals that danger is not a necessary element of sport, although it is certainly a prevalent one. Bowling, golf, and billiards are all sports according to the standardly accepted definition (18), but they hardly involve any interesting degree of physical danger intrinsic to the activities of the sport. By contrast, baseball, boxing, cricket, downhill ski racing, football, free skiing, gymnastics, hang gliding, high diving, hockey, horse racing, judo, karate, lacrosse, marathon running, motor racing, mountain climbing, pole vaulting, polo, rodeo bronco riding, rugby, skydiving, skateboarding, steer wrestling, surfing, and wrestling are all sports that incorporate the presence of physical danger to a substantial degree. And the list could go on. Notice, too, that the entries cut across a division between contact and noncontact sports. Contact sports like boxing, football, and rugby have no special corner on danger. Noncontact sports like free skiing, gymnastics, motor racing, and mountain climbing can involve equally serious or greater threats to life and limb.

It is surely a puzzle why so many people so readily engage in activities that subject them to such risks. It is more puzzling when we recognize that those risks are unnecessary. After all, such activities take place in a separate, temporary world of play that people choose to enter. Moreover, it is not immediately obvious that there is any special direct or indirect value to participating in dangerous sports, *per se*. For it seems possible to realize the same values of athletic excellence, discipline, perseverance, sportsmanship, and so on by pursuing nondangerous or minimally dangerous sports such as badminton, golf, or tennis. And it is obvious that the risks taken today in dangerous sports are increasingly unrelated, even indirectly, to the satisfaction of any practical needs of the participants or of society more generally. That is, the risks taken in dangerous sports are now rarely connected to the preparation of skills that are useful means to satisfying individual or social needs. The ability to dish out a potentially bone-crushing body check in hockey has no evident utilitarian purpose outside that context. Even where there is such a connection, as in sports involving weaponry or martial training, for example, the need to learn such skills to hunt prey or for self-protection has for some time now ceased to be a practical necessity for virtually all participants.

In this context, dangerous sports can appear not only self-destructive but also utterly frivolous and anachronistic. Yet the interest in such sports is hardly waning. The 20th century saw the emergence of many dangerous sports as popular public

---

The author <jsrussell@shaw.ca> is with the Dept. of Philosophy, Langara College, Vancouver, BC V5Y 2E4 Canada.

spectacle (hockey, football, motor racing, etc.), and so-called extreme sports are emerging now at a pace limited only by the capacity for human invention. But there is nothing very new in this, for dangerous sports have always existed and held a fascination for both participants and audiences. One evident explanation for their prevalence and attraction is that more is at stake than in sports in which participants do not place themselves in physical danger. But while this undoubtedly explains a part of the draw of dangerous sports as public spectacle, it simply presses further the question of what their value is for those who freely choose to take unnecessary risks to their lives or bodies by taking part in them.

My aim in this article is to attempt a general defense of the institution of dangerous sports, if not all instances of them, for those who participate in them. Against this, I recognize that the attraction of dangerous sports to particular individuals is bound to be complex. There is unlikely to be a single, all-encompassing explanation for why each individual in fact chooses to participate in these activities. Nevertheless, I will try to show that some obvious reasons people might give for valuing these activities look partial at best and in need of deeper explanation and support. In particular, I will argue that defenses of dangerous sports based on pursuit of glory or honor, or as connected to the development of courage, or as an outlet for physical aggression or risk-taking impulses, or just for pleasure or satisfaction or thrills, are all significantly inadequate. I shall present a general argument for the value of dangerous sports that I believe represents a deeper explanation of the dominant, distinctive value of such sports. I find that value in an ideal of what I shall term "self-affirmation." Dangerous sport in its best exemplars, particularly those in which substantial bodily danger is an immediate and ever-present risk, represents an opportunity for confronting and pressing beyond certain apparent limits of personal, and indeed human, physical and psychological capacities in ways not afforded by other normally available human activity. Thus, I say that the dominant, distinctive value of dangerous sport consists of an activity of self-affirmation because dangerous sport invites us to confront and push back the boundaries of the self by creating contexts in which some of the ordinary bounds of our lives can be challenged. Hence, we discover and affirm who we are and what we can be by confronting and attempting to extend these boundaries. In this sense, dangerous sport is perfectionist. It tests us by requiring us to make the most of our whole selves, of our bodies and our minds working together as a unity, when (or because) everything, or almost everything, is at stake.

These ideas will be developed further later. For now, it is important to recognize that there is a broad existential resonance about such extreme human exertions, because human activity in all areas of serious endeavor, in art and science, for example, can be aptly characterized as a confrontation with, and an attempt to push, the boundaries of our limitations as finite beings. This expresses a familiar response to the conditions of our existence, one that can be found both in myth and in history, from the exploits of Theseus taking the less-traveled road to Athens, to the various campaigns of Joan of Arc, to Kant confronting his dogmatic slumber. In this sense, dangerous sport is continuous with human realities and strivings that are well known to us. Sometimes those strivings can consume us—and not only in dangerous sport. For my purposes, however, the distinctive ideals of self-affirmation that are most directly relevant to dangerous sport can be found in the yearnings of romantic militarism that emerged in the 19th century as a response to the waning

opportunities for expression of martial spirit amid the orderly comfort and security of modern civil society. This will undoubtedly seem a surpassingly odd source for defending the institution of dangerous sport, but in fact the parallels between romantic militarism and dangerous sport are striking and deserve to be explored.

It is not my purpose in drawing this parallel to argue that dangerous sport has an innately military character. I argue that the general ideals that motivate romantic militarism have obvious counterparts in dangerous sport. I shall argue that dangerous sport can and does appropriate those ideals to a more effective extent than does romantic militarism, which was doomed from the start by its inability to be reconciled with either modern civil society or the practice of modern warfare. By contrast, the expression of those ideals through dangerous sport poses no similar threat to civil society. Dangerous sport can civilize those ideals to constrain their worst excesses. Thus, dangerous sport represents a practical and morally defensible institution for realizing an important source of human value. It is an alternative to romantic militarism, not a paler version of it. If I am right, it is hardly surprising that dangerous sport has flourished in recent times whereas romantic militarism has become a mere historical curiosity.

I begin by describing what a dangerous sport is. I then examine various reasons people give for valuing such sports. This will lead to a consideration of my main thesis about the relationship between dangerous sport and self-affirmation.

### **What Is a Dangerous Sport?**

By “dangerous sport,” I mean a sport that involves activity that itself creates a significant risk of loss of, or serious impairment to, some basic capacity for human functioning. Dangerous sports, then, range along a continuum of significant risks. They come in degrees of more or less danger as determined by their potential to harm basic capacities for human functioning and the probability of such harm occurring (that is, by the standard method of assessing risk as a matter of degree and probability of harm). There is a proviso here that must be marked, however. Because all physical activity undoubtedly involves some risk to basic human functioning, we must be careful to preserve some meaningful distinction between dangerous and nondangerous sport. It is likely, for example, that in rare cases badminton players will become paralyzed from injuries incurred from diving for volleys. Thus, there is some risk of loss of basic capacities for human functioning from playing badminton. Rare instances of losing an eye in this sport would be another example. This does not necessarily make badminton a dangerous sport. Thus, I have qualified the definition of dangerous sport so that it must involve some “significant risk” of loss of, or serious impairment to, a basic capacity for human functioning. By this, I mean a risk that is substantial enough that it is, or should be, an expected outcome from time to time that is directly attributable to the specific activities involved in the sport itself and that exceeds the risk of such injury found in participants’ day-to-day life outside of sport by more than a modest degree. Such an injury does not have to be permanent, although typically the potential is there for that.

This does not mark a boundary between nondangerous and dangerous sport with precision, but that is not necessary for my purposes. Even so, we can make this a bit clearer. A key distinction seems to be that in nondangerous sport no special provision is normally needed to protect basic capacities for human functioning

(because the risks are modest at most) or that when such a measure is thought necessary or prudent, it can pretty much guarantee effective protection. By contrast, dangerous sports will usually acknowledge the need to take measures to protect basic capacities for human functioning, but precautions cannot guarantee such protection. Thus, serious head injuries can still occur in sports like football, amateur boxing, or motorcycle racing despite the required use of protective headgear.

There are, of course, elements of serious danger in all physical activity, but it seems right to say that sports like badminton, bowling, golf, and tennis, which are normally acknowledged to be nondangerous, expose their participants to only fairly modest physical risks beyond what might be found in everyday life, if they exceed them at all. Thus, the position I advance seems to conform roughly to our considered judgments about dangerous and nondangerous sport. For example, it is hard for me to imagine that bowling is more dangerous than a vigorous afternoon spent digging a new rose garden in the front yard. Golf is undoubtedly more dangerous, due mainly to the risk of having one's skull split by some duffer's slice peeling off the next fairway. But if those risks were more than modestly greater than the everyday risk of being hit by errant projectiles (or falling off the ladder while clearing the gutters), one would expect serious consideration to be given to head protection. It appears relevant, too, that the victim is a victim *incidentally* as opposed to receiving his lumps as a result of his or her engagement in the sport's activities qua participant. Thus, my main interest here is with more immediately dangerous sports, particularly those in which serious temporary or permanent handicap, or death, is an expected and unpreventable result of direct participation in the specific activities of the sport.

To understand the notion of a dangerous sport we also need to describe more clearly the nature of the injuries that determine that the sport is dangerous. I have suggested that we use the notion of basic capacities for human functioning. A great deal of work has been done on this topic in the last 20 years by theorists of social justice who are interested in determining appropriate levels of basic human functioning for the purposes of measuring and promoting human development, in particular in impoverished countries where measurements of economic growth and gross national product might not accurately reflect improvements in human well-being. This also seems an appropriate metric to judge the harms associated with dangerous sport. It is better than, say, economic loss to an individual, because it measures the effect of injury on the person's physical and mental health, which is what is most directly and immediately threatened in this context. For purposes of this discussion, Martha Nussbaum's list of "central human functional capabilities" is helpful. These include

being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length . . . being able to have good health . . . being able to move freely from place to place . . . being able to use the senses to imagine, think, and reason, and to do these things in a "truly human" way. (8: pp. 80–82)

Thus, sports whose activities can reduce a normal person's life span, significantly interfere with a participant's general health or capacity to move about freely, or undermine cognitive abilities all count as dangerous sports by my account. Nussbaum also includes social capacities for affiliation on this list, but for our purposes here I would emphasize the physical and cognitive capacities of human functioning.

For example, a sport can become an obsession for some to the detriment of their basic capacity for human affiliation, but I don't think this makes it a dangerous sport (or perhaps we should say that any sport is dangerous in this respect).

Finally, it is important to distinguish dangerous sports from dangerous recreations or amusements. If sport involves the exercise of physical and mental excellences for overcoming certain physical obstacles (18), then some types of dangerous activities will not count as dangerous sport, even though they might claim to be sports. Take, for example, some of the main activities of the Oxford Dangerous Sport Club. Among other things, this club has for some time now been flinging people through the air from medieval-style catapults into strategically positioned nets. Accidents have occurred, including at least one reported death,<sup>1</sup> so there is evidently a significant risk to basic human functioning associated with this. Bungee jumping is another more common example of a so-called extreme or dangerous sport that is not a sport. As far as I can tell none of these activities requires physical skill (unless some physical dexterity is involved in deceiving one's health- or life-insurance carrier). These are amusements or recreations or mere play, perhaps, but not sport. I take no position on the applicability of this discussion to these other activities.

### **Attempts to Explain the Value of Dangerous Sports**

Given the public fascination and spectacle that often surround dangerous sport, it is plausible to think that participants take risks to pursue glory or honors associated with participating in them. To use a more modern, inclusive term, I shall speak of pursuing "public recognition" as including glory, honors, adulation, etc. Certainly, pursuit of public recognition is a common enough motivation for engaging in many activities, and it can undoubtedly play some role here. But this looks like an inadequate explanation of the value of dangerous sport for many reasons. The most obvious one is that identifying the value of dangerous sport solely in the public recognition that can be derived from participating in it locates the value outside of dangerous sport in an important sense. That is, dangerous sport has no value whatsoever in itself or for its own sake if it is done for these reasons—it is a mere means to achieving what is of value. Of course, we might have to accept that dangerous sport has only such merely instrumental value, but there are good reasons to think otherwise.

To begin with, many people engage in dangerous sports with no hope or expectation of, or desire for, public recognition. For these athletes there must be some other value to dangerous sport, and it is plausible to think that it is found in the activity itself in some sense. We can support this argument by noting that undoubtedly many of those who do have an expectation or desire for public recognition would, nevertheless, participate in dangerous sports without any prospect of these benefits. Such individuals must recognize some other value of dangerous sport. All this is suggested in the following homage to wrestling:

True wrestling is a sport apart from all others. It is a contest of strength, skill, and sheer will between two men. There are no balls, no goal zones, no roped rings. Just the mat, your opponent, and you. A wrestler is not often given the recognition or fanfare of more popular sports. Yet the demands of will,

discipline, and commitment are extraordinary. While technically a team sport, the action is one-on-one, making self-reliance an inseparable component. Each match becomes a test of ability and character. (19)

According to this writer, wrestlers have little expectation of public recognition or fanfare, but they find its principal value in the test of ability and character that the sport provides. There is no reason to think that wrestling is unique in this respect, even among sports that receive greater public notice. At best, then, the argument to place the value of dangerous sport in public recognition looks as if it could represent the full value of dangerous sport only for some. If so, we should consider what intrinsic value dangerous sport might hold and whether the participant whose sole interest is the pursuit of public recognition might be overlooking something of important value in such activity.

Of course, the very fact of public recognition supports this position. After all, public recognition is itself a way of showing that some activity or accomplishment is valued. That raises the question of what it is that is valued. In the current context it is presumably a recognition of some value or excellence that the athlete has realized. In his classic work on play and games, *Homo Ludens*, Johan Huizinga makes similar points:

From the life of childhood right up to the highest achievements of civilization, one of the strongest incentives to perfection, both individual and social is the desire to be praised for one's excellence. . . . *We want to be honoured for our virtues. . . . In order to merit recognition, merit must be made manifest.* Competition serves to give proof of superiority. (3: p. 63, emphasis added)

Huizinga thus acknowledges what is obvious, namely, that pursuit of public recognition is a powerful motivator. But he is clearly aware that such recognition is *for* the participant's virtues or excellences and that such recognition is the result of having made those virtues publicly manifest. Thus, the existence of public recognition presupposes some value (or values) that is (are) the basis for such recognition. Of course, Huizinga goes too far in suggesting that we all want to be honored for our virtues. Undoubtedly, some athletes pursue their endeavors solely for the sake of public recognition. Such persons often appear to have a shallow commitment to their sports, and this is another reason to consider that they might be overlooking something else of value. In any event, it certainly seems plausible that many athletes pursue public recognition, as Huizinga argues, in order to be honored for virtues made manifest in the course of competition. Because the fact of public recognition presupposes this, as well, we should consider what those virtues or values might be.<sup>2</sup>

Another obvious candidate for the value of participating in dangerous sport is the subjective value that it realizes for the participant. I am thinking here of what might be described as proaffective psychological states such as pleasure, enjoyment, satisfaction, or contentment—in short, psychological experiences that human agents like to have. This is an initially plausible view of the value of dangerous sport. It is difficult to deny that experiences like pleasure or satisfaction are intrinsically valuable, and we seem to be wired biologically to take pleasure in various types of physical activity, particularly those involved in sporting games and play. As well, the

pleasurable adrenaline rush of facing and coming through danger intact is a familiar, satisfying experience for many, and it is one that participants in dangerous sports normally acknowledge and often state as a goal, even a prime goal. Thus, subjective value, or the experience of proaffective psychological states, seems to describe at least part of what people value about participating in dangerous sport.

While I do not deny that subjective value is an important source of intrinsic value in dangerous sport (or sport generally), we should look more carefully at such arguments to consider whether these represent the only source of value in dangerous sport. Consider, however, that if they are, this will press the question even harder about why anyone would wish to participate in such sports, because dangerous amusements offer plenty of proaffective experiences without the effort that dangerous sports entail. The question is immediately raised as to why athletes should bother putting themselves through the rigors and frustrations of playing such sports when the preparation is typically arduous and success is a scarce commodity. Once more, identifying the value of dangerous sport in this way seems to locate it externally to the sport's activity in an important sense, so that the value of dangerous sport itself is simply instrumental. Again this seems at odds with common experience, because athletes who make even a modestly serious commitment to play a sport often appear to participate in it in part because they believe its activities are intrinsically interesting or valuable.

The main problem, however, with claims to make subjective value the exclusive basis for why people participate in dangerous sport (or any sport) is that they pretty clearly rest on a confusion about the role that subjective value often plays in our reasoning about value. The key question is whether people participate in these activities *simply* for the pleasure or satisfaction they get out of them or whether they get pleasure or satisfaction *as a result of* valuing certain activities involving physical excellences or accomplishments and then seeing those realized. If the latter is true at least sometimes, then other things are being valued besides subjective value. Moreover, this seems to represent a universal experience, namely, that of valuing something, say, justice or the well-being of another person or clear reasoning, and getting pleasure or satisfaction as a result of seeing that realized.

This sort of reasoning about value is apparently everywhere in sport, including in dangerous sport. The thrill of pleasure one gets in baseball of pitching a ball for a called third strike on a batter or hitting a home run or throwing out a runner on a steal seems clearly the consequence of believing that those activities have some value. If one did not believe that such excellences or accomplishments had value, then it would be difficult to see what special pleasure would be taken in them. I think this is particularly true of dangerous sport. If one did not think that there was some value in successfully climbing an especially technical mountain, in completing a tricky maneuver to gain an advantage in a hard-fought motorcycle race, or in knocking out an opponent in boxing, it would be difficult to see what pleasure or satisfaction could be taken in the activity. As I have already noted, it is puzzling what this might be, and because the experience of pleasure or satisfaction is often present in these contexts, it is natural to suppose that it is the end of action. I will develop the idea of what this other value might be in the next section, but let me further lay the groundwork for that discussion by presenting a concrete historical example, which I think compellingly demonstrates both the source of this confusion and why it is a confusion.

In *Touching the Void*, one of the classic survival tales in mountaineering, climber and writer Joe Simpson recounted his miraculous solo journey to safety after falling into a deep ice crevasse. In 1985, Simpson and his climbing partner Simon Yates became the first to climb the west face of Siula Grande in Peru. On their descent, Simpson broke his leg badly. This usually means death for a climber on an isolated mountain at high altitude. But Yates designed a way of lowering Simpson by rope down the mountain. Against all odds, this was apparently going to be successful, until Simpson was inadvertently lowered over the edge of a cliff. Yates made the decision to cut the rope suspending Simpson once it became clear that he could no longer hold Simpson's weight and that both of them would soon be pulled off the mountain to their deaths. However, Simpson fell into a deep ice crevasse and landed, still alive, on a small bridge in it. Simpson describes the harrowing despair he felt knowing that he could not climb up the crevasse and would die a slow, lonely death there. He decided to lower himself further into the crevasse, hoping either to find a floor or to die quickly by falling once he could no longer hold himself at the end of his rope. He found a floor a few dozen feet beneath the bridge and from there was able to undertake a difficult climb through a hole in the crevasse. Here is Simpson's recounting of the experience of exiting the crevasse and facing the challenge of descending the rest of the mountain alone:

An excited tingle ran down my spine. I was committed. The game had taken over, and I could no longer choose to walk away from it. It was ironic to have come here searching out adventure and then find myself involuntarily trapped in a challenge harder than any I had sought. For a while I felt thrilled as the adrenalin boosted through me. (15: p. 141)

It is easy enough to read this passage and think that what Simpson finds valuable about "the game" is the pleasurable "tingle" or the adrenaline rush of the new challenge provided for him. But, in fact, if he did not value "the game" and in particular the hard challenge it presented, there is no reason that he would have felt any pleasure or elation. Moreover, Simpson himself implicitly recognizes this. The pleasure evaporates almost immediately and is replaced by a deeply unsettling sense of isolation and loneliness as he realizes the difficulty he faces. But this does not diminish his sense of the challenge's worth:

It sharpened my perception . . . to realize how vital it was just to be there, alive and conscious, and able to change things. There was silence, and snow, and a clear sky empty of life, and me, sitting there taking it all in, accepting what I must try to achieve. (15: p. 141)

Contrary to initial appearance, everything about this passage suggests ideas of value that can be realized in action; that is, it rejects a purely subjective conception of value by implicitly acknowledging objectivist or perfectionist components of value. Pleasure is not the principal goal here—it is the human capacity for willing and acting, that is, for consciously changing things and thereby for achievement, that seeks its own goals and challenges. If there is any lasting pleasure here, it is likely to come from achieving chosen goals by surmounting the obstacles they present.

The arguments examined so far, then, make a compelling case that we should consider what specific value there may be in the activities connected with dangerous sport. There are a few further positions that are sometimes offered, however,



to explain the attraction and value of dangerous sport. I will discuss these briefly before moving on.

It is sometimes argued that the desire to participate in dangerous sport is based in some deeply rooted or even genetically programmed impulse for risk taking that many have, much like a gustatory desire for sweet or fatty foods. Perhaps there is some truth to this. But this is, of course, an extremely weak reed on which to rest any defense of the value of dangerous sport, because if there are such primal urges to engage in dangerous activity, this does not yet show that they are valuable at all. Indeed, they may simply be a biological anachronism. Moreover, this hypothesis overlooks the psychological complexity of humans by ignoring the plausibility of the argument just canvassed, for it is evident that we reason about what gives value to sporting activities and take pleasure in realizing those ends, as well. We still need to consider what this value might be.

It is natural to suppose that this distinctive value is the promotion of a general virtue of courage, because courage requires a capacity to face and master physical danger and dangerous sport poses just that sort of challenge. Courage, like any virtue, is realized in action, so it can be realized directly by participating in dangerous sport. Perhaps this will do as a description of the distinctive value of dangerous sport. It is important to be careful about this, however, for a number of reasons. To begin with, the classic accounts of the general virtue of courage connect it with correct choice. Not just any choice to face physical danger will count as courage. Socrates makes this clear when he points out to Laches that a fearless readiness to stand firm in battle in all conditions involves taking foolishly needless risks that can hardly be described as courageous (10: p. 193 c7–e5). Certainly, a similar point could be made about taking unnecessary risks to one's body or mind in boxing or football or rugby or other dangerous sports.

There are other problems connecting participation in dangerous sports with the general moral virtue of courage. As Huizinga notes, games are "all temporary worlds within the ordinary world, dedicated to the performance of an act apart." He adds that "play as such is outside the range of good and bad" (3: pp. 10–11).

This is too brief a comment on complex matters, but it is true that game playing, including in sport, is separated from ordinary life and that that separation often involves a certain suspension of ordinary constraints of good and bad from everyday life. This is not to say that we completely suspend judgments about good or bad within sport. Certainly, we assess participants as good or bad sports on the field of play, and we often expect them to be role models away from it. Nevertheless, sport often permits opportunity for activities—assaults and deception, for example—that would normally be subject to criminal or other social sanction if they were not committed in games. Boxing is perhaps the clearest example, but there are many others. This raises questions about whether the character traits required in these temporary, separate worlds actually contribute to virtues that are transferable to the regular world once the game stops. This can be doubted. Research into the ethical development of athletes is not particularly encouraging. Some of the key research done in this area, by Shields and Bredemeier, has found that college and high school athletes of both genders had lower capacities for ethical judgment both inside sport and in ordinary life than nonathletes do (13, 14). They point out that this in fact coheres with anecdotal information in personal experience and media reports. This evidence is also readily found in memoirs, particularly of those engaged in contact

sports. For example, in his clear-eyed, first-person account of amateur boxing, the author and playwright Robert Anasi frequently makes the point that people who are attracted to boxing tend to be people who like to fight outside the ring, as well as inside it (1). The courage that they acquire to face an opponent in the boxing ring is not necessarily a socially welcome excellence. It might encourage them to take liberties with people who cross them outside the ring, as it apparently did to Anasi and others with whom he trained.

Dangerous sport, of course, provides opportunities to face physical danger. Although such opportunities bear a connection to courage, it seems evident that there is no straightforward connection between physically dangerous sport and the development of the general everyday virtue of courage. In fact, there is no reason to think that people who play nondangerous sports are less courageous than those who play dangerous sport, and there is some reason to be concerned that physically dangerous sports may sometimes be socially counterproductive in their effects on courage. This should not be taken to imply that play is discontinuous with general moral obligations and virtues, as Huizinga's remark might suggest. As I have argued elsewhere, the opportunity for play afforded by sport is connected to the promotion of human flourishing and the requirement that participants in games participate voluntarily. This implies that games are moral institutions that are broadly continuous with basic moral commitments to human flourishing and respect for persons (12). The opportunities they provide for flourishing, however, are different than, and often at odds with, those permitted in ordinary life. Hence, it is not surprising that certain virtues that are required in this context are not readily transferable to ordinary life. This recognition, however, of how games can expand the opportunities for human flourishing will be important to understanding the value of dangerous sport, as we shall see later.

Another common, related idea about the value of dangerous sports is that they represent a relatively safe outlet for release of physical aggression toward others. Thus, dangerous sport is a way of containing antisocial forces. This is an empirical claim, of course, and I have already expressed some reservations about it in some instances of dangerous sport. But let us suppose that it is true. There are two things to be said about this. First, although this might explain some of the value of dangerous sport for society, it fails to explain the value of dangerous sport for the participant except in instrumental terms—it keeps them out of jail or other types of trouble. But we have already seen that we often reason about the value of sport as if it had intrinsic value in some sense, and this argument does not explain that value. Second, not all dangerous sport involves direct physical aggression toward others. Contact sports do, but mountain climbing, gymnastics, and motor racing do not, although they are certainly dangerous sports. Perhaps these noncontact sports discourage antisocial behavior by providing some sort of outlet or release, but it is not directly as an outlet for physical aggression toward others. A more general related good for participants in dangerous sports might then simply be the release of tension or stress that competition affords, including through the opportunity to best others. This may be a good for society, as well as the individual. There is undoubtedly something to this. But it seems inadequate to locate anything of special or distinctive value in dangerous sport. For nondangerous sports and other play activities can, and do, serve the same purpose for many. If dangerous sports are preferred by some, we apparently need a reason why. And

if some are only inclined to find such release in dangerous sport, medication (or self-medication) might be a more prudent option unless there is a more distinctive value to be found in dangerous sport.

### The Value of Dangerous Sport

The problems with each of these attempts to explain the value of dangerous sport press us to look for a better, or at least a further, defense of its value. Let me try to set the stage for this by drawing on discussions in political philosophy from an earlier time, when modern institutions of civil society were emerging. Although dangerous sport is certainly no modern invention, it is perhaps no accident that it flourishes to such an extent and with such diversity in modern times.

It is too seldom noted that the great architects of modern political economy, such as Adam Smith, Wilhelm Von Humboldt, John Stuart Mill, and others, although they welcomed and supported the orderliness and peaceful security of modern civil society and its capacity to increase wealth and improve living standards, were also acutely aware that these benefits came at the expense of other significant, established values. Smith in his lectures on civil security avers that “the heroic spirit is almost utterly extinguished” by modern commercial society (17: p. 541), and he is quite clear that this is a regrettable loss:

Another bad effect of commerce is that it sinks the courage of mankind, and tends to extinguish the martial spirit. . . . Among the bulk of the people military courage diminishes. By having their minds constantly employed on arts and luxury, they grow effeminate and dastardly. (17: p. 540; see also 16: pp. 734–735)

Mill condemns similar aspects of modern society in equally strong terms in his essay “On Civilization”:

There has crept over the refined classes, over the whole class of gentlemen in England, a moral effeminacy, an inaptitude for every kind of struggle. . . . This torpidity and cowardice, as a general characteristic, is new in the world: but . . . it is a natural consequence of the progress of civilization. (6: pp. 180–181)

These were commonly expressed ideas in Smith and Mill’s times. But it is not as if they occasioned no response. It is possible to see in the romantic notions of self-affirmation that were also prevalent a social reaction, and even a challenge, to the enervating, pacific effects of modern civil society. Nancy Rosenblum’s insightful study of romantic and liberal values in her *Another Liberalism* (11) identifies a key aspect of that reaction as pitting “romantic militarism” against the “prosaic promises” of modern commercial liberal society. She traces this reaction through the works of major English, French, and German romantics including Wordsworth, Humboldt, De Musset, Sorel, Constant, De Vigny, and others.

Romantic militarism comes in many guises but it is defined primarily by its focus on war “as the experience of freedom from inhibitions and conventional constraints” and by militancy as an opportunity for “spontaneous self-display.” Thus, romantic militarism “substitutes extravagant self-assertion and self-display for more benign forms of the pursuit of happiness” (11: pp. 9–10). Rosenblum

argues that romantic militarism thus illustrates a fundamental dilemma of liberalism, namely, that at some level the ideals of personal freedom and self-expression, which are central to liberalism, will always be frustrated even by liberal rights and freedoms and promises of limited government. Thus, Wordsworth wrote in "The Convention of Cintra" that "the true sorrow of humanity consists in this;—not that the mind fails; but that the course and demands of action and of life so rarely correspond with the dignity and intensity of human desires" (20: p. 192). According to Rosenblum, the special arena provided by war answers these longings for romantic militarists (11: p. 9).

The general point here about the fettering of self-affirmation and personal freedom is a familiar enough romantic criticism of modern liberal society. Nietzsche's "last men," whose only aspiration is to a "pitiable comfortable-ness," and his alter ego Zarathustra's scolding remark that "Man is something to be surpassed. What have you done to surpass him?" (7) are perhaps the most familiar romantically motivated philosophical expressions of the same complaint about the enervating and constraining effects of modern civil society. For such thinkers, real heroism is reflected in casting aside everyday boundaries to discover and realize one's true self. But for our purposes it is especially interesting that the romantic-militarist reaction is ultimately traced to ideas of heroic self-affirmation in preparedness to face physical danger. In this respect, it is instructive that Rosenblum chooses to focus on romantic militarism because it reflects "the limits of romantic revolt" and can be used to bring into focus liberalism's openness to certain romantic claims (11: pp. 5–6). In so doing, she unsurprisingly passes over any examination of the challenges to the physical dimension of being that romantic militarism asserted. This is consistent with earlier liberal commentators' responses to such romantic yearnings. Mill regards them as an anachronism and (characteristically for him) encourages the development of more socially congenial character virtues (6). Humboldt, who is attracted by romantic-military ideals in a way Mill is not, ultimately recognizes that opportunities for self-affirmation in war and in other physical struggles that were present for the classical Greeks and others are no longer available and that, ultimately, this is an improvement. Thus, he concludes that "whereas physical variety has declined, it has been succeeded by an infinitely richer and more satisfying intellectual and moral variety" (4: p. 18).

Rosenblum follows in a similar path when she argues that romantics can "make their peace" with liberalism and help reform modern civil society, in particular by reconceiving the public sphere as a place for "heroic self-display" and the private domain as a scene for cultivating "beautiful individuality" through renewed respect for pluralism (11: p. 4).

What is strikingly absent from all these responses to romantic militarism is that they either entirely overlook or treat as an anachronism the romantic impulse to bodily self-affirmation represented in the willingness to confront and master physical danger. If these theorists of modern civil society are correct about its diminishing opportunities for self-affirmation through confronting physical danger, it is hardly surprising that dangerous sporting activities should emerge and flourish. The institution of dangerous sport can be seen as filling this void.<sup>3</sup>

Moreover, if Rosenblum is right that romantic militarism is founded on a will or desire to be free from conventional constraints and inhibitions and to have opportunities for spontaneous self-display, dangerous sports offer an obvious

outlet for such longings that should not be overlooked. Like war and like all play, dangerous sport is a world apart from ordinary life as represented in the everyday activities of work, family, friendship, making plans, and generally getting on. Also as in war, there is a certain suspension of the moral constraints of ordinary life reflected in play. (Where else could one pursue world domination, even at the expense of one's closest intimates, except at the summer cottage playing Risk?<sup>4</sup>) The separate world of play is one that is in some respects beyond good and evil. Hence, it is a place where certain conventional moral constraints and inhibitions grounded in prudence can be discarded for the time being. This fits the description of dangerous sports perfectly. It is a place, indeed, where what would normally count as criminal behavior or plain and utter recklessness or poor judgment is not judged or constrained by the normal conventions or inhibitions of ordinary life. Thus, compare tripping someone at the mall as they break ahead of you to pick up the last unit of your child's coveted Christmas present (clearly a criminal assault) and tripping someone on a partial breakaway in hockey (a 2-minute penalty at most, unless committed in the third period or overtime by the home team, in which case it is just as likely to be overlooked).

Also, few institutions in society provide as rich an array of opportunities for spontaneous self-display as does sport, and this is especially true of dangerous sport. The field of play creates an obvious opportunity for spontaneous self-display for participants. Dangerous sports themselves frequently institutionalize the response to the moment, novel improvisation, and creation or exploitation of immediate opportunity that are all occasions for spontaneous and original self-display that challenge us mentally, physically, and emotionally in the heat of the moment. These opportunities can, of course, be made more demanding by the presence of physical danger as an obstacle to be overcome.

Clearly, then, there are important parallels to be drawn between dangerous sport and the aspirations of romantic militarism. One might still ask, however, how this justifies the value of such activity.

It is evident that these romantic-militarist impulses have a physical, intellectual, and emotional dimension. They strive to encompass and challenge the whole being of the person. Although political philosophers have debated whether romantic yearnings can be accommodated, they have done so at a conventionally social level because they have thought that the accommodation must take place in ordinary life within civil society. As a result, physical aspirations for self-affirmation have understandably been ignored or discounted because of the costs they can impose on others. But this overlooks the opportunity that sport can provide to accommodate what romantics sought along this dimension as part of a challenge to the whole being of the person. Thus, in her now classic writings on boxing, Joyce Carol Oates speaks of the attractions of boxing and other extreme sports in ways that resonate fully with romantics:

Life outside the ring is real—but is it *really* real? Not public display as such but the joy of the body in its straining to its very limits of ingenuity and endurance underlies the motive for such feats of physical prowess as championship boxing or aerial trapeze work. The performer is rewarded by his performance as an end in itself; he becomes addicted, as who would not, to his very adrenaline. *All of life is just getting through the time between acts.* (9: p. 142, original emphasis)

What the romantic spirit recognizes in such activity is release from the enervating safety, comfort, routines, and conventions of prosaic modern civil society, thereby expanding the boundaries of human experience and reality. Such intellectual and emotional release is perhaps possible for some in ideas and discourse; in poetry, fiction, art, nonsporting games, and all manner of creation of fantastic visions; in science, and so on. By contrast, dangerous sport can offer a missing, though parallel, opportunity for release for the physical body, but in ways that also directly challenge the other dimensions of our being. Dangerous sport is not quite unique in this sense; nondangerous sport can also offer such challenges. But these are not such that they challenge the body, and therefore all other of our basic human capacities, to remain intact while facing threats to its very being or to fundamental aspects of it. Arguably, then, participating in dangerous sport has the potential, in principle at least, to be more satisfying than pursuing nondangerous activity, which can often seem vaguely anemic by comparison, because it can incorporate a challenge to capacities for judgment and choice that involves all of ourselves—our body, will, emotions, and ingenuity—under conditions of physical duress and danger *at the limits of our being*.<sup>5</sup>

Facing physical danger in sport thus represents an opportunity for self-affirmation that challenges us distinctly along all the basic dimensions—physical, emotional, and intellectual—that constitute our being as practical, self-directed agents. It can extend those dimensions by challenging us to preserve ourselves physically while devising and willing action to overcome dangerous obstacles that would not, or should not, be present in ordinary life. The greater these obstacles and challenges, the greater the achievement in these respects. And so in confronting serious physical danger through our own choice and actions, we can be affirming our being by meeting and extending the boundaries of our existence. In this sense, dangerous sport can often appear to challenge us to the very limits of what it is to be a certain type of embodied rational being. No other sports, games, or ways of transcending the boundaries imposed on us by ordinary life or play quite permit this, although perhaps war or protection of public safety does in some circumstances. This can explain the value of dangerous sport for its participants. It can also explain the special awe and fascination audiences have for such sports, their attraction to them as public spectacle, and the recognition those audiences bestow on participants. Oates again makes this point succinctly in discussing boxing—a (if not the) quintessential dangerous sport—although her remarks apply in different degree to all dangerous sport:

Boxers are there to establish an absolute experience, a public accounting of their outermost limits of their beings; they will know, as few of us can know of ourselves, what physical and psychic power they possess—of how much or how little they are capable. (9: p. 8)

Let me conclude this section by noting that what I have described as self-affirmation obviously has a close connection to ideals of self-realization. There are of course many different accounts of self-realization, but a dominant theme sees self-realization as a perfectionist idea involving realization of distinctive human capacities. The classic view has Aristotelian and Platonist origins where self-realization involves mastery of capacities for choice and deliberation. Self-realization thus involves a sort of practical self-mastery, which in turn requires

developing and exercising character and intellectual virtues, having good social relations with others, developing distinctive human talents, and having favorable external circumstances that will support these goods in a self-sustaining unity. There is no direct suggestion here that self-realization requires a testing and pressing of the very limits of the person, although it may do so at times along the way. It is easy to see why, for pressing the very limits of who we are can hold dangers, too, and threaten to upset the harmony and unity of a realized self. A common, and characteristically romantic, concern is that this sort of ideal can be too complacent and lacking in challenge. Perhaps this is an unfair criticism. I cannot argue it here. But what the romantic asserts much more explicitly is that an important type of self-realization requires a confrontation with, and an attempt to surpass, the apparent limits of oneself. I have characterized this as a type of self-affirmation. In reaching and attempting to surpass our limits, we inevitably confront what we are. In doing so, we affirm or declare to ourselves who we are and what we are striving to make of ourselves. Dangerous sport, in its best exemplars—in, say, mountain climbing or boxing or bicycle stage racing—provides one avenue for such self-affirmation by challenging one's whole self at the limits of one's being. It is a particularly rich avenue of realization because it forces us to confront and overcome fear of danger and to face physical threats to those things that we cannot put a value on. Of course, all this makes sense only against a commitment to a perfectionist idea of value, but we have seen that our reasoning about value strongly reflects this sort of commitment. And this speaks to something deep in us. Testing ourselves against danger to see what we are capable of, and thereby affirming who and what we are, puts us on the same path as Theseus coming of age and choosing to take the longer, more dangerous route to Athens to present himself to his father.

### **Further Considerations of Value and Practice**

If I am right, this account shows why the elimination of all physical risk in sport would be a misguided goal and that something of important value would be lost thereby, specifically, the opportunity to test ourselves at the limits of our being. This, of course, does not mean that countervailing prudential considerations carry no weight, but it does mean that they cannot be presumed to outweigh these other considerations of personal value. As in other cases of assuming risk where competing considerations of personal value might be at stake, we should take a fairly standard nonpaternalist approach. That is to say, the decisions of competent persons should generally be respected if they are properly informed about the relevant risks. Dangerous sports as institutions typically add a mild paternalistic requirement that participants also be properly prepared to undertake such risks. In these circumstances, decision makers should normally be presumed to be in the best position to weigh competing considerations for themselves, and allowing them to do so respects them as persons.

In assessing the value of dangerous sport, it is also instructive to see that it is in many ways superior in realizing romantic militarism's own objectives and values. Romantic-militarist yearnings for self-affirmation seem utterly disconnected from the actual circumstances of military life. They are typically driven by mythic accounts of war<sup>6</sup> rather than the grimness, discipline, and the oppressive routines, rules, and bureaucracy of actual military activity. And, as the romantic

militarists knew, with each advance in the art of war the opportunities for individual self-assertion and spontaneous self-display recede (4: p. 47). In these respects, romantic militarism was doomed from the start. By contrast, dangerous sport more successfully accommodates the yearnings of romantic sensibilities, the challenge to one's whole self, and the heightened experience of freedom and reality that comes from surpassing the boundaries of ordinary existence. It is not surprising then that romantic militarism waned and dangerous sport has flourished in recent times.

Another key success of modern dangerous sports is that they do not represent a direct challenge to civil society in the way that romantic militarism and 19th-century romanticism in general did. Dangerous sport represents a sort of accommodation with liberal civil society that romantic militarists yearned for but most knew was ultimately impossible. Indeed, romantic militarists often saw their outlook as an idealized vision of perfect freedom and self-expression, not as a practically realizable option (11: p. 9). The institution of dangerous sport is, then, superior to romantic militarism in that it has the capacity to be realized and, in that process, to civilize some of the worst excesses of the latter's aspirations. This is most obvious in the social costs of militarism, which are remarkable and are typically imposed on many others besides the participants themselves. Dangerous sport does not have anything like these costs; its costs by and large fall on the participants themselves. To be sure, dangerous sport cannot accommodate all of what the romantic militarist desires. It draws an important boundary to the romantic's yearnings to impose his or her will on the real world of human affairs. But those yearnings undeniably require boundaries, and dangerous sport as play may even reinforce our awareness of them.

There are also more prosaic advantages of dangerous sport. As games, opportunities for realizing the distinctive values of dangerous sport can be ready-made with defined starts and finishes and do not have to wait on public events. Also, the institution of dangerous sports can ensure that their participants are properly informed about the dangers of such activities, that risks fall narrowly on those who genuinely consent to participate, that excessive risks are managed or eliminated, and that dangerous activities are undertaken only by those who are properly prepared to undertake them and who have the capacity to consent to them. There is room for debate here over whether some sports are so dangerous that consent to them would be such an uncertain matter that they should be forbidden altogether. Sometimes a ban on boxing is proposed on these grounds. I am, in the main, skeptical about such arguments, and although I cannot address this issue here, I will note that support for boxing is usually argued, rightly in my view, on antipaternalistic grounds (2). What is missing in these discussions, however, is a clearer appreciation of what sorts of values boxing might realize. It is not as if nothing of important value would be lost if boxing were banned, and this should have weight in the argument. It is not as if the antipaternalistic argument carries little weight because the sport itself has negligible or merely frivolous value, so that no one is really harmed by its elimination. Issues of consent, which are key in my view in dangerous sport, must be examined with this in mind, because the value of dangerous sports is important enough that it cannot be counted an anachronism or frivolous, and the suspension of the ordinary implied in play in general, and in dangerous sports in particular, means that we must be careful about importing considerations found in everyday morality to evaluate them.



A related ethical issue has to do with the involvement of children in dangerous sport, given in particular that the problems of informed consent are clearly present and some sort of paternalism is standardly thought to be acceptable. A different moral issue that is often discussed in this context is the effect that tragedies of dangerous sport have on loved ones who are left behind. This is another issue that deserves careful ethical treatment. Certainly, one can raise moral questions about the voluntary undertaking of serious, unnecessary risks when one has obligations to family, in particular to children, to fulfill. But such a debate should be conducted with a clear appreciation of the value of dangerous sport and why it is so important to some to pursue such activities. In any event, such a discussion does not challenge dangerous sports so much as it raises a question as to how, if at all, participation in dangerous sport can be reconciled morally with certain types of personal relationships. These are all issues that deserve further discussion in light of what has been presented here.

We have seen, then, that there is distinctive value in dangerous sport but that such value is continuous with strivings in other sport and in other areas of human activity. There are also certain practical advantages to dangerous sport over alternatives that pursue similar values. There is more here to be discussed and worked out, and it is possible that there are other sources of value that I have missed that help explain the value of dangerous sport. But enough has been said, I hope, to demonstrate certain distinctively valuable features of dangerous sport.<sup>7</sup>

## Notes

<sup>1</sup>“Man Killed in Catapult Stunt.” November 25, 2002, *BBC News*. Available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/2510573.stm>. Accessed June 1, 2003.

<sup>2</sup>I have been speaking of a certain type of skeptic about the value of dangerous sport itself who claims that public recognition counts as the sole source of value in such activity. It is worth noting, however, that those who steadfastly profess to have public recognition as their end do not have to reject the idea that there are other values to dangerous sport. I have previously referred to “sports amoralists” as those who pose an interestingly distinct skeptical challenge to the idea of moral obligation in sport (12: pp. 152–154). Sports amoralists recognize such obligations but are simply indifferent to them. We can extend the notion of a sports amoralist to include those who recognize the intrinsic value of participating in a sport but are indifferent to, and thus not moved by, such values. Such people, then, might be motivated to pursue other goods that are external to those found in sporting activities. This might well apply to some athletes who take public recognition as representing the sole source of value in their activity. They may pursue dangerous sport for public recognition and the benefits it confers, say, the status, the social opportunities, the adulation and respect of others, the money, etc. None of this, however, denies the preceding argument. Indeed, it accepts the argument that public recognition is still *for* certain types of excellence or accomplishment and that without a perception that these were valuable there would of course be no such adulation, respect, money, etc. Sports amoralists actually accept that there are such values, but they are simply not interested in or motivated by such values and are drawn to other goods instead.

I have no doubt that sports amoralists exist (and sometimes come into existence once the benefits of public recognition are bestowed on them), and it is plausible to think that they would be a part of this odd group that would engage in sport just for its external

benefits. But they do not represent a challenge to the idea that there may be intrinsic value to participating in dangerous sport. Their challenge is a different one, namely, that such values provide no reason on their own to engage in these activities. Whether they have reason to be motivated by those values, however, is a separate question from the question of whether such values exist and what their nature is. The latter is my main issue here, so I will not systematically address the special challenge posed by the sports amoralist, which, in any event, is a general one and does not apply only to dangerous sport. It involves demonstrating that the value of sport, including dangerous sport, is worth pursuing for its own sake. Before we can pursue that question, however, we need to be satisfied that there are such values and to know what they are about. Most of us are not sports amoralists, so we assume that such values do provide reasons for actions. That is the assumption I will work with here, and although I will have things to say about motivation, I will not directly address the challenge posed by the sports amoralist, and it is possible that more argument is necessary to fully answer this challenge.

<sup>3</sup>Indeed, it seemed to do so even in the 19th century. See Robert McFarlane's tracing of the history of mountain climbing. McFarlane makes no reference to romantic militarism, but he sees the emergence of mountain climbing as a recreation and sport in the 19th century as having its source significantly in Nietzschean reflections about the value of confronting fear and also as a response to "cosseted urban living" (5: pp. 86–88). There was quite a bit of nonsense spoken at this time about the value of confronting danger. McFarlane quotes a letter from John Ruskin that asserts that confronting and mastering danger produces "a stronger and better man, fitter for every sort of work and trial, and *nothing but danger produces this effect*" (5: p. 86, original emphasis). I make no such claims here.

<sup>4</sup>For the uninitiated, Risk is a board game in which the object is for each participant to achieve world domination at the expense of all the others. There are no rules regarding the making—or breaking—of alliances to achieve this objective, so it models international relations on a state of nature free of moral constraints.

<sup>5</sup>Thus, I am revising Oakes's remark here slightly. It is not that dangerous sport challenges us to "the very limits of ingenuity and endurance" but that ingenuity and endurance can be challenged at the limit of our being.

<sup>6</sup>Humboldt's views about the virtues of war are founded in classic Greek and Roman myths. See Rosenblum's remarks at (11: pp. 13–17).

<sup>7</sup>I am indebted to an audience at The Ohio State University in June 2003 for many helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I have benefited particularly from the comments of three anonymous reviewers for this journal and from nonanonymous colleagues Alister Browne, Murray Mollard, and Ted Pallys.

## References

1. Anasi, R. *The Gloves: A Boxing Chronicle*. New York: North Point Press, 2002.
2. Herrera, C.D. "The Moral Controversy Over Boxing Reform." *Journal of the Philosophy of Sport*. IXXX(2), 2002, 163–173.
3. Huizinga, J. *Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in Culture*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1950.
4. Humboldt, W. von. *The Limits of State Action*. Edited by J.W. Burrow. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969.
5. McFarlane, R. *Mountains of the Mind: How Desolate and Forbidding Heights Were Transformed Into Experiences of Indomitable Spirit*. New York: Pantheon Books, 2003.

6. Mill, J.S. "On Civilization." In *Dissertations and Discussion: Political, Philosophical and Historical*. Vol. I. London: John W. Parker and Son, 1859, pp. 160-205.
7. Nietzsche, F. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. Trans. Thomas Common. In *The Philosophy Source* [CD ROM], Daniel Kolak (Ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1999.
8. Nussbaum, M. *Women and Human Development*. Oxford: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
9. Oates, J.C. *On Boxing*. Expanded ed. New York: HarperCollins, 2002.
10. Plato. *Laches*. In *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*, Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Eds.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963.
11. Rosenblum, N.L. *Another Liberalism: Romanticism and the Reconstruction of Liberal Thought*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987.
12. Russell, J.S. "Moral Realism in Sport." *Journal of the Philosophy of Sport*. XXXI(2), 2004, 142-160.
13. Shields, D.L., and B.L. Bredemeier. *Character Development and Physical Activity*. Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics, 1995.
14. Shields, D.L., and B.L. Bredemeier. "Moral Reasoning in the Context of Sport." Available at <http://tigger.uic.edu/~Inucci/MoralEd/articles/shieldssport.html>. Accessed December 20, 2004.
15. Simpson, J. *Touching the Void*. London: The Random House Group, 1997.
16. Smith, A. *The Wealth of Nations*. New York: The Modern Library, 1937.
17. Smith, A. *Lectures on Jurisprudence*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978.
18. Suits, B. "The Elements of Sport." In *Philosophic Inquiry Into Sport*, W.J. Morgan and K.V. Meier (Eds.). Champaign IL: Human Kinetics, 1995 [1973], pp. 8-15.
19. "What Is Wrestling?" Available at <http://www.geocities.com/Colosseum/Arena/6677/articles/WhatIsWrestling.html>. Accessed June 1, 2003.
20. Wordsworth, W. "The Convention of Cintra." In *Political Tracts of Wordsworth, Coleridge, and Shelley*, R.J. White (Ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953, pp. 117-193.

Copyright of Journal of the Philosophy of Sport is the property of Human Kinetics Publishers, Inc. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.