Harjit Bhogal

About me

I'm an Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Maryland, College Park. I work mainly in philosophy of science and metaphysics. Though recently I've been doing some work in metaethics.

I'm currently working on projects investigating the nature and theoretical role of coincidences; the Humean approach to metaphysics; and how understanding the nature of scientific explanation can help us make progress on some classic disputes in ethics.

Before coming to Maryland I received my PhD from NYU in 2017. My thesis was about explanation in the special sciences. Before that I did a B.Phil in Philosophy and a BA in Philosophy, Politics and Economics, both at the University of Oxford.

My email is bhogal@umd.edu.

Here is a CV.

Also, I'm on Philpeople.

Publications

• Necessities Overboard: A Reply to Lange
  British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (Forthcoming)
  Abstract | PDF

  In this discussion note I reply to some criticisms that Marc Lange (2022) has directed at my Humean view of scientific laws (Bhogal, 2020) -- about whether Humean views can make sense of the apparent fact that laws are counterfactually invariant. The key idea of my response is that the Humean should think of their reduction of the laws to the Humean mosaic as closely related to other views where we reduce one domain to another but still allow that the higher-level domain can be `autonomous' of the lower-level in some respects -- like, for example, the view that the special sciences reduce to physics but can still can work autonomously of physics.

  
  
• What Chance Doesn't Know (with Michael Hicks)
  Journal of Philosophy (Forthcoming)
  Abstract | PDF

  Humean accounts of chance have a problem with undermining futures: they have to accept that some series of events are physically possible and have a nonzero chance but are inconsistent with the chances being what they are. This contradicts basic platitudes about chances (such as those given by Bigelow et al. (1993) and Schaffer (2007)) and leads to inconsistency between plausible constraints on credences. We show how Humeans can avoid these contradictions by drawing on metaphysically impossible worlds that are, nevertheless, scientifically possible. One major advantage of our approach is that one single move deals with these both problems, whereas previous Humean approaches to undermining (such as that given by Lewis (1994), Thau (1994), and Hall (1994)) have only addressed the connection between credence and chance. Furthermore, our approach connects more closely with the way we employ stochastic scientific theories. And it’s part of a unified solution to other challenges that the Humean faces.

  
  
• What Motivates Humeanism?
  Philosophical Studies (Forthcoming)
  Abstract | PDF | Published

  The ‘great divide’ in the metaphysics of science is between Humean approaches—which reduce scientific laws (and related modalities) to patterns of occurrent facts—and anti-Humean approaches—where laws stand apart from the patterns of events, making those events hold. There is a vast literature on this debate, with many problems raised for the Humean. But a major problem comes right at the start—what’s the motivation for Humeanism in the first place? This is rather unclear. In fact Maudlin, and other anti-Humeans, claim that there is no good motivation for Humeanism. I criticize a few influential approaches to motivating Humeanism—in particular those based on empiricism, pragmatism, and fidelity to science. In their place I suggest a different type of motivation, which has not received much attention in the literature, that rests on considerations of the role of unification in scientific understanding

  
  
• Moral Principle Explanations of Supervenience
  Philosophical Studies (2024)
  Abstract | PDF | Published

  Explaining the supervenience of the moral on the natural is, perhaps, the central metaphysical challenge for the non-naturalist. However, Scanlon (2014) and Fogal and Risberg (2020) have developed a strategy which purports to explain supervenience rather simply. Fogal and Risberg call it the 'Divide and Conquer' strategy. The key idea is to postulate explanatory moral principles linking the natural and the moral. The moral principles are metaphysically necessary, so trivially supervene on the natural. All other moral facts are determined by the necessary moral principles and the natural facts, so they supervene on the natural too.

  I argue that there are two versions of the Divide and Conquer strategy and both fail. The first strategy doesn’t give an adequate explanation of supervenience because it doesn't properly identify what makes a difference to the holding of supervenience. The second perhaps does give an adequate explanation of supervenience, but only by introducing something similarly puzzling that needs explanation.

  Consequently, non-naturalists need additional metaphysical machinery to develop their view -- just appealing to moral principles or metaphysical laws won't do the job.

  
  
• Moral Necessitism and Scientific Contingentism
  Oxford Studies in Metaethics (2024)
  Abstract | PDF

  Here is a puzzling phenomenon. Moral theories are typically thought to be necessary. If act utilitarianism is true, for example, then it is necessarily true. However, scientific theories are typically thought to be contingent. If quantum field theory is true, it’s not necessarily true — the world could have been Newtonian. My aim is to explore this discrepancy between domains.

  In particular, I explore the role of what I call `internality’ intuitions in motivating necessitism about both moral and scientific domains. In effect, these internality intuitions tell against the explanatory role of certain `external’ entities – like moral or scientific principles. I’ll suggest that perhaps these internality intuitions are more compelling in the moral case than the scientific case. If so, this would rationalize the combination of moral necessitism and scientific contingentism.

  
  
• Explanationism vs Modalism in Debunking (and Theory Choice)
  Mind (2023)
  Abstract | PDF | Published

  At the core of the recent debate over moral debunking arguments is a disagreement between explanationist and modalist approaches. Explanationists think that the lack of an explanatory connection between our moral beliefs and the moral truths, given a non-naturalist realist conception of morality, is a reason to reject non-naturalist realism about morality. Modalists disagree. They say that, given a non-naturalist conception of morality, our beliefs have the appropriate modal features with respect to truth -- in particular they are safe and sensitive -- so there is no problem.

  There is something of a stand-off here. I argue, though, that by looking at the role explanatory and modal factors have to play in theory choice more generally, and, in particular, by looking at some cases of theory choice in scientific practice, we can see that the explanationist is right. The lack of an explanatory connection between our moral beliefs and the moral truths is a reason to reject non-naturalist realism about morality.

  
  
• What's the Coincidence in Debunking?
  Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2023)
  Abstract | PDF | Published

  Many moral debunking arguments are driven by the idea that the correlation between our moral beliefs and the moral truths is a big coincidence, given a robustly realist conception of morality.

  One influential response is that the correlation is not a coincidence because there is a common explainer of our moral beliefs and the moral truths. For example, the reason that I believe that I should feed my child is because feeding my child helps them to survive, and natural selection instills in me beliefs and dispositions that help my children survive since that is conductive to my genes continuing through the generations. Similarly, the reason that it’s morally good to feed my child is because it helps them to survive, and survival is morally valuable.

  But if we look at some cases from scientific practice, and from everyday life, we can see, I argue, why this response fails. A correlation can be coincidental even if there is a common explainer. I give an account of the nature of coincidence that draws upon recent literature on scientific explanation and argue that the correlation between moral belief and moral truth is a coincidence, even given such common explainers. And I use this to defend a certain form of debunking argument.

  
  
• The Package Deal Account of Naturalness
  Humean Laws for Human Agents, edited by Michael Hicks, Siegfried Jaag, and Christian Loew, Oxford University Press (2023)
  Abstract | PDF

  Some properties – like charge – are natural, some – like grue are unnatural. The distinction between natural and unnatural properties is normally taken as primitive. However, Barry Loewer’s Package Deal Account (PDA) aims to provide an reductive account of natural properties, integrated with a reductive account of laws of nature. In addition, the account seems to be able to apply to natural properties at the level of fundamental physics, and higher-level, special science, properties.

  If the acccount is successful, then, it looks to be incredibly powerful and attractive. The PDA, however, is somewhat underexplored in the literature. So the first aim of the paper is to understand the PDA better -- to map the connections between naturalness and laws on the traditional BSA and to consider how those connections have to adapted in order to develop different versions of the PDA.

  The second aim is to start to evaluate different versions of the PDA. In particular, perhaps the most promising version of the PDA construes it as an instance of a larger approach to Humeanism — one that has been very visible in the recent literature — that focuses on the role of 'ideal observers' or 'ideal scientists'. While such an approach might be feasible, I claim, it gets it's proponents much less than they were originally hoping for.

  
  
• Humean Nomic Essentialism (with Zee R Perry)
  Noûs (2023)
  Abstract | PDF | Published

  Humeanism -- the idea that there are no necessary connections between distinct existences -- and Nomic Essentialism -- the idea that properties essentially play the nomic roles that they do -- are two of the most important and influential positions in the metaphysics of science. Traditionally, it has been thought that these positions were incompatible competitors.

  We disagree. We argue that there is an attractive version of Humeanism that captures the idea that, for example, mass essentially plays the role that it actually does in the laws of nature.

  In this paper we consider the arguments that have lead many to conclude that Humeanism cannot be combined with Nomic Essentialism; we identify the weaknesses in these arguments; and we argue in detail that a version of Humeanism based on a variant of the Best System account of laws captures the key intuitions behind nomic essentialism.

  
  
• On Unexplained (Modal) Patterns
  Erkenntnis (2022)
  Abstract | PDF | Published

  Some patterns call out for explanation, in the sense that we have a pro tanto reason to reject theories that do not give them an appropriate explanation. I argue that certain modal patterns call out for explanation in this way—and this provides a reason to reject certain theories of modality that fail to explain such patterns. However, I also consider a response to this argument, which claims that the modal patterns do not need explanation. This response might be viable but it involves some substantial commitments about the nature of explanation.

  
  
• Difference-making and Deterministic Chance
  Philosophical Studies (2021)
  Abstract | PDF | Published

  Why do we value higher-level scientific explanations if, ultimately, the world is physical? An attractive answer is that physical explanations often cite facts that don't make a difference to the event in question. I claim that to properly develop this view we need to commit to a type of deterministic chance. And in doing so, we see the theoretical utility of deterministic chance, giving us reason to accept a package of views including deterministic chance.

  
  

• Induction and the Glue of the World
  Australasian Journal of Philosophy (2021)
  Abstract | PDF | Published

  Views which deny that there are necessary connections between distinct existences have often been criticized for leading to inductive skepticism. If there is no glue holding the world together then there seems to be no basis on which to infer from past to future. However, deniers of necessary connections have typically been unconcerned. After all, they say, everyone has a problem with induction. But, if we look at the connection between induction and explanation, we can develop the problem of induction in a way that hits deniers of necessary connections, but not their opponents. The denier of necessary connections faces an `internal' problem with induction -- skepticism about important inductive inferences naturally flows from their position in a way that it doesn't for those who accept necessary connections. This is a major problem, perhaps a fatal one, for the denial of necessary connections.

  
  
• Humeanism about Laws of Nature
  Philosophy Compass (2020)
  Abstract | PDF | Published

  Humeanism about laws of nature is, roughly, the view that the laws of nature are just patterns, or ways of describing patterns, in the mosaic of events. In this paper I survey some of the (many!) objections that have been raised to Humeanism, considering how the Humean might respond. And I consider how we might make a positive case for Humeanism. The common thread running through all this is that the viability of the Humean view relies on the Humean having an importantly different conception of explanation to the anti-Humean.

  
  

• Coincidences and the Grain of Explanation
  Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2020)
  Abstract | PDF | Published

  I give an account of what makes an event a coincidence.

  I start by critically discussing a couple of other approaches to the notion of coincidence -- particularly that of Lando (2017) -- before developing my own view. The central idea of my view is that the correct understanding of coincidences is closely related to our understanding of the correct 'level' or 'grain' of explanation. Coincidences have a kind of explanatory deficiency — if they did not have this deficiency they would not be coincidences. This deficiency, I claim, is the same explanatory deficiency as when we give low-level explanations of special science phenomena. Such explanations are typically too specific and not robust enough. I claim that there is this same badness in purported explanations of coincidences.

  I cash out this idea sketching an account of explanatory goodness — an account of what makes explanations better or worse -- and using that to give a more precise account of coincidences.

  
  

• Nomothetic Explanation and Humeanism about Laws of Nature
  Oxford Studies in Metaphysics (2020)
  Winner of the 2018 Sanders Prize in Metaphysics
  Abstract | PDF

  Humeanism about laws of nature — the view that the laws reduce to the Humean mosaic — is a popular view, but currently existing versions face powerful objections. The non-supervenience objection, the non-fundamentality objection and the explanatory circularity objection have all been thought to cause problems for the Humean. However, these objections share a guiding thought — they are all based on the idea that there is a certain kind of divergence between the practice of science and the metaphysical picture suggested by Humeanism.

  I suggest that the Humean can respond to these objections not by rejecting this divergence, but by arguing that is appropriate. In particular the Humean can, in the spirit of Loewer (2012), distinguish between scientific and metaphysical explanation — this is motivated by differing aims of explanation in science and metaphysics. And they can further leverage this into distinctions between scientific and metaphysical fundamentality and scientific and metaphysical possibility. We can use these distinctions to respond to the objections that the Humean faces.

  
  

• What the Humean should say about Entanglement (with Zee R Perry)
  Noûs (2017)
  Abstract | PDF | Published

  Tim Maudlin has influentially argued that Humeanism about laws of nature stands in conflict with quantum mechanics. Specifically Humeanism implies the principle Separability: the complete physical state of a world is determined by the intrinsic physical state of each space-time point. Maudlin argues Separability is violated by the entangled states posited by QM.

  We argue that Maudlin only establishes that a stronger principle, which we call Strong Separability, is in tension with QM. Separability is not in tension with QM. Moreover, while the Humean requires Separability to capture the core tenets of her view, there's no Humean-specific motivation for accepting Strong Separability.

  We go on to give a Humean account of entangled states which satisfies Separability. The core idea is that certain quantum states depend upon the Humean mosaic in much the same way as the laws do. In fact, we offer a variant of the Best System account on which the systemization procedure that generates the laws also serves to ground these states.

  We show how this account works by applying it to the example of Bohmian Mechanics. The 3N-dimensional configuration space, the world particle in it and the wave function on it are part of the best system of the Humean mosaic, which consists of N particles moving in 3-dimensional space. We argue that this account is superior to the Humean account of Bohmian Mechanics defended by Loewer and Albert, which takes the 3N-dimensional space, and its inhabitants, as fundamental.

  
  

• Minimal Anti-Humeanism
  Australasian Journal of Philosophy (2017)
  Abstract | PDF | Published

  I argue that there is a tension in our theorizing about laws of nature. We have powerful reasons to think that laws are not universal generalizations -- if they are we would face the problem of explanatory circularity. But we have powerful reasons, stemming from our practice of using and reasoning with laws of nature, to think that laws are universal generalizations.

  I start by elucidating this tension. I then suggest a view of laws that avoids this tension -- I call it Minimal anti-Humeanism. The view says that the laws are the universal generalizations that are not grounded in their instances. This view has advantages in addition to avoiding the tension -- for example, it is ontologically minimal and provides clear answers to the classic identification and inference problems for accounts of law. I end by locating the view in the Humean versus anti-Humean debate. The view turns out to be not easy to classify in these terms -- as the name suggests, I think it is best understood as an anti-Humean view, but reasonable people could disagree. Either way, the view is one which could be attractive to people with both Humean and anti-Humean inclinations.

  
  

In Progress

• A paper on coincidence and moral worth (PDF) (Handout)
• A paper about a 'leveled' picture of the moral domain, analogous to our picture of science as involving both fundamental science and higher-level sciences.
• A paper about subjectivism about reasons and normative explanation
• A paper about natural properties in the special sciences (PDF)
• A paper about the idea that some facts call out for explanation more than others (PDF)
• A paper about explaining the regularity of the world (PDF)
• Why are there High-Level Regularities?; (under commission for a volume forthcoming with OUP edited by Katie Robertson and Alastair Wilson)
• A paper about quasi-realism in metaethics and disingenuousness (with Martín Abreu Zavaleta, Dan Waxman, and Mike Zhao)

Recent/Upcoming Talks

• Necessities Overboard: A Reply to Lange
  Society for the Metaphysical of Science Annual Conference, Online
  August 30, 2024 | Handout
• The Explanatory Structure of Moral Worth
  Rutgers University, Colloquium
  November 14, 2024 | Handout
• The Explanatory Structure of Moral Worth
  Simon Fraser University Workshop on Luck and Achievements
  November 23-24, 2024
• The Moral Special Sciences
  Symposium on Parallels Between Metaethics and Philosophy of Science, APA Eastern
  January 8-11, 2025